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We explore the impact of major revenue mobilization episodes on income distribution dynamics 
using a new “narrative” database of major policy changes in tax and revenue administration 
systems, covering 45 emerging and low-income countries from 2000 to 2015. Our main finding is 
that after a tax reform (particularly those affecting the personal income or the operation of the 
revenue administration), the Gini index falls and the bottom income share rises. This result does 
not hold for sub-Saharan Africa, calling into question the design of tax reforms implemented in 
the region (mostly fragile states in the sample). In general, to reduce more rapidly income 
inequality (and improve the income prospects of the poorest strata of the population), it would be 
more effective to implement tax reforms when the economy is growing relatively slowly. Finally, 
the smaller the government and the smaller the tax system, the larger the beneficial impact of tax 
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There is considerable emphasis on both emerging and low-income countries collecting 
more taxes from domestic sources to help achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 
This is because the resources required to finance the SDGs are huge and the ability of advanced 
countries to transfer resources through aid are heavily constrained by their debt-to-GDP ratio, 
which now exceeds 100 percent of GDP on average and are likely to increase even further 
following the COVID-19 crisis.  The Addis Ababa Agenda for financing development pays special 
attention to domestic resource mobilization in emerging and low-income countries and SDG 17.1 
tracks country level domestic resource mobilization efforts. However, domestic resource 
mobilization should not come at the cost of impoverishment of the poor or widening of income 
disparities.  
Developing countries are on pace to collect public revenues of about $4,444 per person 
annually by the end of 2020, which corresponds to over $1 per person per day. This compares with 
$16,200 per person in richer countries (2015 data). If developing countries were to improve 
revenue-to-GDP by an extra 2 percentage points by the end of 2020, their annual public revenues 
would increase collectively by $144bn – which corresponds to more than the total amount of 
development aid recorded in 2016 (Oxfam, 2019).1 
Generally speaking, inequality refers to the degree to which distribution of economic 
welfare generated in an economy differs from that of equal shares among its inhabitants (KNBS 
and SID, 2013). Inequality is a multifaced concept that can be reflected in terms of access to basic 
services, opportunities, income, among others. Our focus in this paper is on income inequality. 
Even though some (positive) degree of income inequality is unavoidable, and it may even stimulate 
investment and innovation, there is ample evidence showing that elevated levels of inequality can 
cause financial, political and social instability and undermine the pace and sustainability of 
                                                 
1 This Oxfam calculation is based on 2000–2015 trends in population growth and domestic revenue mobilization. 
Based on conservative GDP growth projections, Oxfam calculated two scenarios for revenue increases. With those 
trends, they project that the average revenue-to-GDP ratio would be 24 percent and collective GDP would be around 
US$7.225 trillion. This would generate around $1.738 trillion in domestic revenues collectively by developing 
countries in 2020. With projected population of 3.913 billion people in developing countries in 2020, the $1.738 
trillion in revenues would be equivalent to $1.22 per person daily revenues. 
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economic growth (Benabou, 1996; Berg and Ostry, 2017; Cingano, 2014, Ostry et al., 2014; 
Agnello et al., 2017). 
Due to high levels of income inequality around the world, many governments have made 
redistribution of income a major policy goal.2 In Figure 1 we plot the median Gini coefficient on 
disposable income from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) between 
1970 and 2015 in selected geographical regions. We can observe that, at the end of the time span, 
sub-Saharan Africa is the region with the highest inequality.3 While countries in Asia and the 
Middle East have been relatively stable over time, there has been a rising trend in inequality in 
both European and North American regions. 
 
Figure 1. Gini (disposable income) by region over time, 1970-2015 
 
Note: blue line refers to Latin America; green line refers to Sub Saharan Africa; dark red line refers to Middle East 
and North Africa; grey line refers to Asia; light red line refers to North America; orange line refers to Europe. 
Source: SWIID 
 
The list of underlying cyclical and structural forces affecting the level and dynamic 
evolution of inequality is long. These range from demographic trends to persistent cross-country 
differences in macroeconomic policies or different institutional settings (see e.g. Jalles and Mello, 
2019). One that has been receiving growing attention is the role attributed to fiscal policy which 
                                                 
2 Piketty (2014) presents a new approach to understanding the evolution of income and wealth distribution by 
examining historical evidence. According to Krugman (2014), unequal compensation and high incomes of a few 
individuals have led to accumulation of wealth. 

















shapes a country´s distribution of income and poverty (Clements et. al 2015; DeFina and 
Thanawala, 2004). This has made the role of government in income redistribution - in particular, 
the tax-benefit system – all the more relevant (Ortiz and Cummins, 2011; Rosen and Gayer, 2014).4 
Governments need to strike a balance between efficiency and redistribution when designing a tax 
system (Clements et. al, 2015; Diamond and Mirrlees, 1971).5  
Studies have shown that in many countries a substantial proportion of the poor are made 
poorer (or non-poor made poor) by the tax and transfer system. Higgins and Lustig (2016) find 
that in ten of twenty-five countries they studied at least one-quarter of the poor paid more in taxes 
than they received in transfers. This is because tax and transfer systems in low and middle-income 
countries are typically far less effective than those in OECD countries at reducing poverty and 
inequality (Bastagli et al., 2015). In the OECD countries, the tax and transfer systems have lowered 
average market income Gini by one-third (Coady et al., 2015). The relative ineffectiveness of tax 
and transfer systems in emerging and low-income countries is attributable to low level of revenues 
and poor targeting of spending programs. 
As we discuss in more detail in section 2, many authors have looked at the role attributed 
to different taxes in affecting both economic growth and income inequality in an effort to 
understand taxes that make the overall revenue system pro-poor and more inclusive. The majority 
of these studies focus on advanced economies and many have not reached a consensus on the 
nature of the tax-inequality relationship (Atkinson and Leigh, 2013). Tax and revenue 
administration reforms are typically not randomly assigned in time and space and vary widely 
across developing countries, and their effects in improving income distribution, if any, are not 
clearly established. This paper contributes to filling this gap by analyzing the relationship between 
inequality and tax policy by using a new dataset that does not suffer from the limitations of cross-
sectional or time units, as has been the case with other studies (e.g. Piketty and Saez, 2003). From 
a policy point of view, as Bird (2005) suggested, the issues related to income distribution not only 
are relevant to tax policy, but they also affect the minds of policy makers with regard to vertical 
and horizontal justice. A good understanding of the distributive impact of ordinary taxes should 
help in moving towards justice-oriented tax systems without sacrificing efficiency (Askari, 2011). 
                                                 
4 Taxation provides resources to the government to perform critical roles such as economic stabilization, allocation 
and redistribution (Musgrave, 1959).  
5 The theory of optimal taxation looks at the tax design that seeks to maximize social welfare, an analysis that is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
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We use a “narrative” database of major increases in government tax revenue, stemming 
from both improvements in revenue administration and specific tax policy measures, put together 
by Akitoby et al. (2019) for 45 developing economies (23 emerging and 22 low-income) during 
2000 to 2015. Using this database, we estimate the dynamic short to medium-term response of 
income distribution proxies to different tax policy measures. An important novelty and strength of 
this database is the precise timing and nature of key legislative tax actions (or tax reform “shocks”) 
over the 15-year period. We rely on the local projection method (Jordà, 2005), which has been 
used to study the dynamic impact of macroeconomic shocks such as financial crises (Romer and 
Romer, 2017) or fiscal shocks (Jordà and Taylor, 2016). Because the short-term effects of tax 
reforms may differ depending on the phase of the business cycle prevailing at the time of the 
reform and initial conditions (such as the size of the existing tax system or general government), 
we also explore the role of these non-linearities in shaping the dynamic response of income 
distribution proxies to tax reforms6, using the smooth transition autoregressive model developed 
by Granger and Teräsvirta (1993).  
While we argue that the dataset used in the paper provides an exogenous source for tax 
reforms, endogeneity can still be a potentially significant concern in our framework since i) 
revenue mobilization efforts may not necessarily be exogenous events; and ii) several authors have 
found it difficult to control for the two-way causality between income and inequality in most cross-
country studies. We try to address these major methodological challenges by controlling for 
expected economic growth at the time of revenue reforms and other possible short-term drivers of 
income inequality. In order to mitigate potential endogeneity concerns, we also estimate our 
specifications using an Instrumental Variable (IV) approach. On the one hand, to instrument 
revenue mobilization reforms we draw instruments from the political economy literature for the 
drivers of structural reforms more broadly (and not necessarily only fiscal or economic reforms in 
general). On the other hand, we use the growth rate of real GDP of main trading partners to 
instrument output growth, following Cevik and Correa-Caro (2020). 
The main findings can be summarized as follows. After a general tax reform, the Gini index 
slowly falls, and the bottom income share slowly rises. This result is driven largely by countries 
                                                 
6 See Cacciatore et al. (2016) and Duval and Furceri (2018) for examples on the nonlinear effects of reforms on 
macroeconomic variables depending on the phase of the business cycle. See IMF (2019) for the role of the fiscal 
stance in affecting reforms covering macroeconomic variables in developing countries. 
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outside sub-Sahara Africa. Particularly effective in improving the income distribution seems to be 
personal income tax (PIT) reforms and also reforms in the operation of the tax revenue 
administration. The results further show that the design of tax reforms has been ineffective in 
reducing disposable income inequality in sub-Saharan Africa; unlike other country groups, PIT 
reforms worsened the Gini coefficient. Our results are robust to a battery of tests including the 
exclusion of country fixed effects, the addition of time effects and time trends, controlling for other 
short-term drivers of inequality (including expectations about future growth). Conducting 
endogeneity robust estimations, we found stronger negative (positive) effects of tax reforms on 
inequality (bottom income share). We also found that in order to reduce more rapidly income 
inequality and improve the income prospects of the poorest strata of the population, it is more 
effective to implement tax reforms when the economy is growing relatively slowly. Finally, the 
smaller the government and the smaller the tax system, the larger the beneficial impact of tax 
reforms on income distribution.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. As background, context and motivation 
for our empirical analysis, Section 2 provides an overview of related literature. Section 3 presents 
the empirical strategy followed to study the dynamic response of income distribution proxies to 
revenue mobilization reforms. Section 4 presents the data and key stylized facts. Section 5 
discusses the baseline empirical results, sensitivity and robustness checks. Section 6 concludes and 
elaborates on the policy implications. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
An extensive literature is available on the determinants of income distribution.7 
First and foremost, most authors tend to agree that a high degree of income inequality affects 
economic growth negatively (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Perotti, 1996; Cingano, 2014; 
Bourguignon, 2004; Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 2001).8 There are several reasons for this. High inequality 
is typically associated with unequal access to basic facilities and opportunities, political instability 
                                                 
7 The inequality literature can be divided into two strands: the first group studies income inequality (Golding and 
Margo, 1992; Feenberg and Poterba, 1993, 2000; Frank, 2009; Atkinson et al., 2011); the other focuses on wealth 
inequality (Saez and Zucman, 2016; Johannesen and Zucman, 2014; Alstadsaeter et al., 2019).  




and social problems (such as crime and other conflicts and the use of illegal drugs which further 
worsens social inequalities) (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010; Ortiz and Cummins, 2011). 
Globalization, technological change, changes in demography, unemployment and disparities in the 
distribution of wages and salaries are seen as the major causes of income inequality (Krugman, 
2007; Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 2001; Stiglitz, 2012). 
At the same time, higher taxes can generate negative consequences for growth by affecting 
consumption and investment decisions (Feldstein, 2012). Earlier theoretical studies on taxation 
show how higher taxes tend to discourage investment rates (Auerbach and Hasset, 1991) as well 
as labor supply of individuals (Hausman, 1985) and productivity growth, the latter adversely 
affecting research and development.9 Subsequently,  some authors  used endogenous growth 
models to simulate the effects of tax reforms on economic growth and found that a decrease in the 
distorting effects of the current tax structure may lead to a permanent increase in economic growth 
(Gale, 1996).  
Much of the empirical work examining the effect of income inequality on growth argues that 
inequality affects growth through its effect on taxes and redistribution (Barro, 2000; Milanovic, 
2002; Perotti, 1992; Persson and Tabellini, 1994). The conventional wisdom is that taxes 
(particularly individual and corporate) were largely motivated politically by “concerns about 
equity” and can help in reducing inequality and redistributing income (Burman, 2015). The general 
argument, based on the median voter hypothesis, is that as the ratio of median income to mean 
income falls the median voter will vote for higher taxes and greater redistribution.10 Therefore, 
greater income inequality should lead to greater progressivity.11 Ultimately, the design of the tax 
system determines its redistribution ability (Diamond and Mirrlees, 1971; Atkinson and Stiglitz, 
1976; Saez, 2012).  
The distribution efficiency of different taxes across countries and has been studied by e.g. Chu 
et al. (2000), Martinez-Vasquez et al., 2012) and Clements et. al. (2015). Some studies show that 
the effect of taxes on inequality and poverty is small and/or weak, more so in developing countries 
                                                 
9 The main channel is that corporate and personal income taxes reduce incentives to raise supply through capital 
accumulation or productivity enhancements (Schwellnus and Arnold, 2008; Vartia, 2008; Galindo and Pombo, 2011). 
10 A small but growing number of empirical studies have examined the effect of democracy on total tax revenues and 
the composition of taxation (Aidt and Jensen, 2009; Boix, 2001; Kenny and Winner, 2006; Profeta et al., 2013). 
11 Progressive taxation was thought to be strategically important to favor a more inclusive process of economic 
development (Kaldor, 1963). How changes in tax progressivity affect income distribution has been the object of 
several papers at the cross-country level including Feenberg and Poterba (1993), Feldstein (1995, 1999), Piketty et al. 
(2014), Frey and Schaltegger (2016) and Saez (2017).  
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(e.g. Bird and Zolt, 2014). The reason as noted earlier is that in developing countries, tax-benefit 
systems are less developed and, therefore, potentially less redistributive,  there is greater reliance 
on indirect taxes (compared with advanced economies), lower progressivity in direct tax schedules 
and less comprehensive formal social safety nets.12 According to Prasad (2008), there are four main 
reasons why developing countries rely more heavily on indirect taxes than direct taxes. First, given 
their low-income level, the tax base is relatively small and, as a result, indirect taxes represent an 
easier way to collect government revenue (Bahl and Bird, 2008; Casale, 2012).  Second, the 
efficiency of collecting direct taxes in developing countries is often poor. Third, income tax 
evasion is high. Fourth, developing countries have a large informal sector which does not pay 
income taxes. 
There are several reasons why developing countries are less capable of using the tax system to 
redistribute (Bastagli et al., 2015). First, income and wealth taxes play a relatively small role in 
their tax structure compared with advanced economies. Second, the personal income tax in 
developing countries is often a merely wage withholding tax.13 The limited ability of the personal 
income tax to tax effectively income from most forms of capital may suggest that it is less likely 
that the rich would bear significant tax liability. Third, it may be politically difficult to impose 
effective income tax and wealth taxes in many countries. 
Despite the prevalence of redistribution as a guiding motive in the design of tax systems in 
developed countries, poverty and/or inequality considerations have generally been of secondary 
importance in developing countries´ fiscal reforms. A growing body of literature has documented 
the positive effect of the tax reforms of the 2000´s in reducing income inequality in Latin America 
(Jimenez et al., 2010; Cetrangoilo and Gomez Sabaini, 2007; Hanni et al., 2015).14  Ideally, this 
should be achieved while minimizing distortionary effects on growth caused by taxation.15  
                                                 
12 In the case of Latin America, for example, incidence analysis shows that the redistributive impact of tax-benefit 
systems varies considerably from country to country, and it tends to be stronger in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay 
(Brezzi and de Mello, 2016), although they are considerably less redistributive than in advanced economies. Ilaboya 
and Ohonba (2013) found that tax burden has a significant negative effect on income inequality in Nigeria (using 
household survey data). 
13 In many countries taxes on labor in the formal sector comprise over 90 percent of the total individual income tax 
revenue. In some countries, the tax law does not reach income from capital, such as capital gains. In other countries, 
the limitations of tax administrations may effectively exempt certain types of income from tax. 
14 This contrasts with earlier findings that taxation had a negligible effect on income inequality in Latin American 
countries in previous decades (Cornia et al., 2011). 
15 Empirically, a number of studies support the hypothesis that distortive taxes hold back growth more than others 
(Kneller et al., 1999; Gemmel et al., 2011, 2014; Johansson, 2016; Drucker et al., 2017). Corporate and personal 
income taxes are considered more distortionary than consumption or property taxes as shown by Arnold et al. (2011). 
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Common reforms include a shift from trade taxes to domestic sales taxes, the rationalization 
of income taxes and increase of its progressivity16, and measures to reduce budget deficits and/or 
raise tax-to-GDP ratios while improving the efficiency of tax collection (IMF, 2014). Another 
commonly considered policy action includes the shift of the revenue mix away from corporate or 
personal income tax towards consumption (value-added) and property taxes, which could be 
growth-enhancing. Indeed, Acosta-Ormaechea and Yoo (2019) confirmed that consumption and 
property taxes are more growth friendly than income taxes. Similarly, McNabb and LeMay-
Boucher (2014) and Drucker et al. (2017) found that reducing the share of income taxes in the 
revenue mix would raise GDP growth. 
Most cross-country empirical studies support that direct taxes are progressive hence they are 
better instruments to redistribute income than indirect taxes (Obadic et al., 2014; Saez, 2010; 
Barnard, 2010; Weller, 2008).17 Consumption taxes negatively affect income distribution 
(Martinez-Vasquez et al., 2012; Karanfil and Ozkaya, 2013). The efficiency of consumption taxes 
and its role in enhancing equity was examined in a qualitative study by Correia (2007). For 
efficiency purposes a single rate is preferred to increase the revenue yield, combined with a well 
targeted transfer program (Engel et al. 1999; Okner, 1975). The more the consumption taxes 
contribute to the government revenue, the stronger are the effects on efficiency and welfare for the 
low-income earners. This view of consumption tax contrasts with the common view that these 
taxes are regressive.18 This regressivity can be mitigated by having differentiated rate; lower rates 
for basic goods and higher rate for luxury goods, though this complicates the tax administration 
and is sub-optimal (Saez, 2010). Higher VAT thresholds for registration of traders can also obviate 
the regressivity associated with consumption tax since the poor tend to buy more from small 
traders.  AfDB (2010) advocates removal of tax exemptions and incentives in the Kenya tax system 
as they undermine tax equity and lead to revenue losses. Askari (2011), analyzing the Iranian case, 
finds that direct taxes affect income distribution negatively due to tax evasion while indirect taxes 
                                                 
16 In the post-WWII period policymakers assigned to taxation the specific role of promoting redistribution through the 
introduction of high taxes on income (Cornia et al., 2011). Recent public debate has focused on the role of income 
taxes in reducing inequality (Atkinson, 2015; Piketty, 2014).  
17 The main reason is that, while consumption and property taxes are close to proportional - all individuals are subject 
to the same tax rate irrespective of their level of income -, personal income taxes are typically progressive. In 
developing countries in particular consumption taxes are borne by all consumers both in the formal and informal 
sector, while personal and corporate income taxes are usually paid by firms in the formal sector; the informal sector 
escapes paying income taxes.  
18 Swistak et al. (2015) analyzing value-added tax reforms in Poland found these to be regressive. According to Saez 
(2010) commodity taxes can be used to complement direct taxes to redistribute income.  
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have a positive impact on income distribution. Karanfil and Ozkaya (2013) find that indirect taxes 
have a long run positive impact on poverty in Turkey. Saez (2016) finds that the 2013 US tax 
increase of the top marginal rate had a large negative effect on reported income at the top. 
This paper contributes to the literature on income inequality drivers by looking specifically at 
the role played by tax reforms by category, which has been largely overlooked and for which there 
is no consensus. 
 
3. Econometric Methodology 
 
In order to estimate the dynamic response of income distribution proxies to tax revenue 
reforms, we follow the local projection method proposed by Jordà (2005) to estimate impulse-
response functions. This approach has been advocated by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013) 
and Romer and Romer (2017) as a flexible alternative to vector autoregression (autoregressive 
distributed lag) specifications since it does not impose dynamic restrictions. It is better suited to 
estimating nonlinearities in the dynamic response—such as, in our context, interactions between 
tax reform shocks and macroeconomic conditions. The baseline specification is: 
 
 𝑦𝑡+𝑘,𝑖 − 𝑦𝑡−1,𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + β𝑘𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + ε𝑖,𝑡 (1) 
in which y is the dependent variable of interest, namely an income distribution proxy19; 𝛽𝑘 denotes 
the (cumulative) response of the variable of interest in each k year after the tax revenue reform; 𝛼𝑖   
are country fixed effects, included to take account of differences in countries’ average current 
account balance; 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 denotes the tax revenue reform shock in the area considered - if there are 
sequences of years with the same type of reform, we focus only on the first year of a given tax 
reform episode to improve the identification and minimize reverse causality problems (for a similar 
approach see Ball, Furceri, Leigh, Loungani, 2013).20  𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is a set a of control variables including 
two lags of tax reform shocks, two lags of real GDP growth and two lags of the dependent variable.  
Equation (1) is estimated using OLS. Impulse response functions (IRFs) are then obtained by 
plotting the estimated 𝛽𝑘 for k= 0,1,..5 with 90 (68) percent confidence bands computed using the 
                                                 
19 Since both poverty and income inequality are both aspects of income distribution, we employ as dependent variables 
both Gini measures and also income shares of the top and bottom deciles of the population.  
20 All revenue mobilization reform shocks featured in our analysis are country-wide shocks.  
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standard deviations associated with the estimated coefficients 𝛽𝑘—based on robust standard errors 
clustered at the country level.21 According to Sims and Zha (1999) “the conventional pointwise 
bands common in the literature should be supplemented with measures of shape uncertainty”. 
Hence, for characterizing likelihood shape, bands that correspond to 68 percent posterior 
probability - or one standard deviation shock - provide a more precise estimate of the true coverage 
probability.22 An important issue raised by some scholars (Piketty and Saez, 2007; Poterba, 2007) 
is the potential reverse causation between economic inequality and taxation that may generate an 
endogeneity problem in the relationship under consideration. According to this rationale, lower 
degrees of economic inequality may be the contemporaneous result of a more redistributive tax 
structure (i.e. a tax structure imposing a large tax burden on capital relative to labor) rather than 
solely the cause of it. Tax revenue reforms may not be entirely exogenous shocks as they could be 
potentially anticipated, correlated with past changes in economic activity and implemented 
because of concerns about fiscal sustainability or other important developmental needs. The same 
is true with respect to the potential endogeneity of income in affecting inequality dynamics. These 
potential methodological limitations are dealt with by relying on tax data constructed to reflect the 
relevant tax legislation and, therefore, are exogenous to the general economic conditions and to 
any indirect channel that may affect the realized tax policy. Technically these limitations are 
addressed in Section 5 with a series of robustness checks, including the use of an Instrumental 
Variable (IV) approach. For tax reforms, we rely on instruments from the political economy drivers 
of reforms. Regarding the potential non-exogeneity of income, we follow Cevik and Correa-Caro 
(2020) that instrument it using the growth rate of main trading partners. 
 
4. Data and Stylized Facts 
4.1 Income Distribution  
Income inequality proxies, namely the Gini index, is obtained from the Standardized World 
Income Inequality Database (SWIID), constructed by Solt (2009) using the UN World Income 
Database and the Luxembourg Income Study. Taxes determine the disposable income available 
                                                 
21 Another advantage of the local projection method compared to vector autoregression (autoregressive distributed 
lag) specifications is that the computation of confidence bands does not require Monte Carlo simulations or asymptotic 
approximations. One limitation, however, is that confidence bands at longer horizons tend to be wider than those 
estimated in vector autoregression specifications. 
22 Other papers that have employed one standard deviation bands include e.g. Giordano et al. (2007), Romer and 
Romer (2010), Bachmann and Sims (2012). 
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for consumption to the households and thus influence income distribution. However, the 
disposable income does not take into account indirect taxes (Karanfil and Ozkaya, 2013). This 
creates a limitation when only disposable income is considered. As a result, we look at both pre-
tax-and-transfers and post-tax-and-transfers Gini indices.23 According to Poterba (2007), this also 
mitigates the reverse causality problem since post-tax-and-transfers vary “mechanically” and 
“economically” with the fiscal system whereas the pre-tax-and-transfers measure vary solely 
through the endogenous responses of labor supply or the general equilibrium effect on factor 
prices. In fact, the SWIID provides comparable estimates for two definitions of the Gini coefficient 
- the first based on market income and the second net of taxes and transfers – on an annual basis. 
This allows us to assess income inequality before and after fiscal redistribution through tax reforms 
and provides comparable Gini figures across countries and over a long span of time. However, the 
imputation methodology to standardize observations collected from various sources makes these 
series subject to measurement uncertainty (Jenkins, 2015).24 Ferreira et al. (2015) compared eight 
inequality datasets25 to conclude that “although there is much agreement across these databases, 
there is also a non-trivial share of country/year cells for which substantial discrepancies exist” and 
that “the methodological differences […] often appear to be driven by a fundamental trade-off 
between a wish for broader coverage on the one hand, and for greater comparability on the other”.26 
As a complement, we use the top and bottom 10 percent income shares retrieved from the 
World Bank´s World Development Indicators (WDI). 
Guided by the tax reform data we focus on a panel of 45 developing countries between 
2000-2015.27 Based on this sample, Figure 2 shows the interquartile range of alternative proxies 
for income distribution. We observe that over the last 15 years inequality, as measured by 
                                                 
23 The Gini indicators based on disposable income cover the total market income received by all household members 
(gross earnings, self-employment income, capital income), plus the current cash transfers they receive, less income 
and wealth taxes, social security contributions and current transfers that they pay to other households. 
24 Multiple imputation methods are used which essentially rely on assuming that ratios between different inequality 
measures are constant, or stable, and can therefore be used to predict those variables when they are not observed (Solt, 
2009). 
25 Five are microdata-based: CEPALSTAT, Income Distribution Database (IDD), LIS, PovcalNet, and Socio-
Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (SEDLAC); two are based on secondary sources: “All the 
Ginis” (ATG) and the World Income Inequality Database (WIID); and one is generated entirely through multiple-
imputation methods: the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID). 
26 As this paper places a special emphasis on the Sub-Saharan African (SSA) region, we decided to maximize coverage. 
For instance, the WIID includes 350 inequality observations for SSA between 1960-2012 of which only five are 
labeled high quality, while the SWIID – which we use – includes 934 observations for this region and treats all of 
them as comparable in quality terms. 
27 The list of countries by region is provided in the Appendix. More than 1/3 of the sample comprises of SSA countries.  
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disposable income has been on a downward trend but this fact is often obscured by the fact that 
market Gini has been increasing since the early 2010´s. This points to a useful and powerful role 
of the tax-benefit redistributive systems in these countries in recent years (see bottom left panel).28 
As inequality and poverty while different are related concepts and then to go hand-in--hand, in the 
bottom right panel, we can see that the income share of the bottom 10 percent of the population 
has also been on the rise. 
 
Figure 2. Interquartile Range of Income Distribution Proxies over time, 2000-2015 
Gini Disposable Income Gini Market Income 
  
Relative Redistribution Bottom income share 
  
Note: figure plots the average (mean), median, bottom and top quartiles (pctile_25 and pctile_75, respectively) of 
respective variables´ distributions. Relative redistribution measures the difference between market and disposable 
Gini indices. The bottom income share corresponds to the income share of the bottom 10 percent of the population. 
Source: SWIID and WDI. 
 
There is significant dispersion across economies in terms of income inequality. It is 
essential to analyze the time series properties of the data to avoid spurious results by conducting 
                                                 
28 Redistribution is typically defined as the difference between market income and disposable income inequality. Some 























































panel unit root tests. We check the stationarity of all variables by applying the Im-Pesaran-Shin 
(2003) procedure, which is widely used in the empirical literature dealing with non-stationary 
panels. The results, available upon request, indicate that the Gini indices used in the analysis are 
stationary after logarithmic transformation. 
 
4.2 Tax Reforms 
Countries determine the composition of their tax system by making policy changes to tax 
bases, tax rates and exemptions. The tax reform database put together by Akitoby et al. (2019) is 
now explored carefully in this paper. In identifying the episodes of large tax revenue mobilization, 
Akitoby et al. (2019) focused on countries with more tangible tax revenue mobilization results; (i) 
countries that have increased their tax-to-GDP ratios by a minimum of 0.5 percent each year for 
at least three consecutive years (or 1.5 percent within three years); (ii) countries with beyond 
average increases in their tax-to-GDP ratios; and/or (iii) countries with better tax performance 
compared with peers in the same income group (see original source for further details). 
This tax reform database has several advantages for our own empirical purposes: it 
identifies the precise nature and exact timing of major tax actions in key areas of tax policy and 
revenue administration; identifies the precise tax reforms that underpin what otherwise looks like 
a gradual improvement in standard tax-to-GDP; identifies major reforms that truly led to increases 
in revenue, as opposed to just a long list of (small or not economically meaningful) policy changes. 
All these aspects of data are particularly useful for empirical analysis that seeks to identify, and 
then estimate, the dynamic effects of tax reform shocks. The strengths of this “narrative” tax 
reform database come with one limitation; because two large reforms in a given area (for example, 
a change in Personal Income Tax) can involve different specific actions (for example, tax 
introductions (“new taxes”), rate changes, threshold changes and changes to exemptions), only the 
average impact across major historical tax reforms can be estimated. It should be noted that the 
tax reform database provides no information regarding the current (or past) fiscal stance in the 
countries under scrutiny, which is not the purpose of this paper.  
Tables 1-3 present stylized facts on reforms in the following categories: personal income 
tax (PIT), corporate income tax (CIT), goods and services taxes split between 3 subcategories 
(value added taxes (VAT), excises and general other goods and services taxes), trade taxes, 
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property taxes and, finally, revenue administration.29 The vast majority of tax revenue reforms in 
our sample were in the category of goods and services taxes and most reforms were implemented 
during the period 2010-2015 (Table 1). Exceptions are, e.g., tax reforms in the area of excises, 
trade or property, which were implemented more during 2000-2004. In SSA the majority of tax 
revenue reforms were in the area of goods and services, and during the 2000-2004 period. In the 
more recent period, SSA has been focusing more on CIT reforms. 
 













Sample  all all all SSA SSA SSA 
PIT 9 6 9 1 3 0 
CIT 17 9 21 17 9 21 
Goods and Services Taxes 67 32 74 27 9 17 
GST 15 6 21 8 3 6 
VAT 21 10 17 10 3 4 
EXCISE 31 16 36 9 3 7 
TRADE 15 7 9 13 3 5 
PROPERTY 4 1 0 4 0 0 
REVENUE ADMINISTRATION 9 0 2 4 0 1 
 
Figure 3 provides the number of years of tax reforms identified in the sample and illustrates 
the heterogeneity of reforms efforts by type. Excise reforms have been more frequently 
implemented. In general, fewer major reforms have been implemented in the areas of property 
taxes. Reforms in tax administration have been more the rule than the exception, acompanying a 
specific tax policy measure. Out of 119 years of tax reforms, only 17 correspondend to tax policy 
measures not acompanied by improvements in revenue administration. 
 
  
                                                 
29 Revenue administration reforms includes measures in 8 distinct areas, namely: i) management, governance and HR; 
ii) large taxpayers office and segmentation; iii) IT system; iv) registration and filling; v) audit and verification; vi) 
management of payment obligations; vii) improving compliance; viii) customs clearance. According to Akitoby et al. 
(2019), hiring more qualified staff, strategic planning and monitoring performance, focusing on training and 
strengthening tax legislation to empower revenue collection agencies were the most commonly implemented measures 
(77 percent of episodes). 
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Figure 3. Number of country-years with tax revenue reforms by type  
(45 developing economies, 2000-2015) 
 
 
In terms of geographical distribution, emerging market economies did more reforms in the 
area of personal income tax, value-added and excises, while low-income countries focused more 
on trade taxes (Table 2). As for other categories of taxes both groups are comparable and also 
when it comes to revenue administration reforms.  
 
Table 2. Reform shocks by group of countries (number of tax reform country-years) 
 EME LIC SSA Resource- 
Rich 
Fragile 
Number of countries 23 22 10 6 13 
PIT 16 8 4 2 4 
CIT 23 24 12 4 6 
Goods and Services Taxes 99 74 53 14 49 
GST 20 22 17 2 10 
VAT 30 18 17 0 17 
EXCISE 49 34 19 12 22 
TRADE 10 21 21 5 15 
PROPERTY 1 4 4 0 4 
REVENUE ADMINISTRATION 57 45 33 7 24 
 
Finally, tax reforms have been more frequently implemented during periods of higher 
economic growth—that is when the real GDP growth in each country was above its historical 





















Type of Tax Revenue Reform
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PIT 8 16 
CIT 20 27 
Goods and Services Taxes 75 98 
GST 17 25 
VAT 20 28 
EXCISE 38 45 
TRADE 10 21 
PROPERTY 2 3 
REVENUE ADMINISTRATION 48 54 
Note: lower (higher) economic growth = real GDP growth below (above) the reforming country’s historical average.  
 
Descriptive statistics on different income distribution proxies before and after the 
beginning of these tax revenue reform episodes suggest that tax reforms have on average been 
associated with a decrease in the Gini index based on disposable income in the years after the 
reform (Figure 4). The fall in the Gini index based on disposable income is larger than the one 
based on market income, meaning an improvement in redistribution in the years after a tax reform, 
reflecting both the impact of taxes and increased capacity of governments to fund transfer 
programs. This is consistent with an increase in the income share of the bottom 10 percent of the 
population. Section 4 tests whether this (unconditional) suggestive evidence holds up to more 





Figure 4. Evolution of income distribution proxies around Tax Revenue Reforms 
 
Gini Disposable Income Gini Market Income 
  
Relative redistribution Bottom income share 
  
Note: x-axis in years; t=0 is the year of the tax reform shock.   
 
 
4.3 Other Data 
Real GDP comes from the IMF´s World Economic Outlook (WEO) database and tax 
variables from the World Bank´s World Development Indicators (WDI). Specifically, by analyzing 
different tax categories in percent of GDP for the sample of 45 countries in our panel we get the 
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Figure 5. Composition of tax revenues (% GDP) in 45 developing countries, 2000-2015 
Total Tax Revenue Personal Income Tax 
  
Corporate Income Tax Value-added Tax 
  
Trade Tax Property Tax 
  
Excise Tax  
 
 
Note: green line denotes the 75th percentile of the respective distribution; the blue line denotes the mean; the red line 
denotes the median; and the yellow line denotes the 25th percentile of the respective distribution. All charts expressed 
in percentage of GDP. 








































































Note that according to the summary statistics present in Table A1 in the appendix, we will 
focus, in what follows, on those reforms with the largest distributional impact based on their 
importance measured in terms of corresponding tax shares to GDP. Taxes on goods and services, 
in the last year considered 2015, averaged 6 percent of GDP in the sample of countries considered. 
This was followed by PIT and then Trade and CIT. Lastly, property taxes accounted for a relatively 
small amount in GDP terms (only 0.6 percent).  
 
5. Empirical Results 
A.   Baseline 
Figure 6 shows the results of estimating equation (1) for alternative dependent variables. 
Both the 90 and 68 percent confidence bands are shown. After a general tax revenue mobilization 
reform takes place real GDP growth does not seem to be initially affected, starting a decline after 
2 years but the effect is not statistically different from zero even after 5 years. In contrast, it seems 
that inequality goes down and the effect is particularly visible when using the Gini index based on 
disposable income. After 5 years the Gini falls by 0.7 percent (which corresponds to one standard 
deviation – the situation that took place in Uruguay in 2002 or Guinea-Bissau in 2004) and this 
effect is statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level. The effect is not as strong in 
magnitude and significance when employing the Gini index based on market income, but still the 
downward sloping reaction stands out. Complementary, a general tax reform can help improving 
the income share of the bottom 10 percent of the population by 0.5 percentage points (or two 
standard deviations – the situation that took place in Kyrgyzstan in 2010) after 5 years. These 
effects show that there is merit in using the tax system for redistribution purposes. Note however 
that redistribution reflects not only the impact of taxes on economic agents who have the ability to 





Figure 6. Impact of Tax Revenue Reforms on Different Variables  
Real GDP (percent) Gini Disposable Income (percent) 
  
Gini Market Income (percent) Income share of bottom 10% (percentage points) 
  
Note: x-axis in years; t=0 is the year of the tax reform shock. Solid black lines denote the response to a tax reform 
shock, blue dashed lines denote 90 percent confidence bands and green dashed lines denote 68 percent confidence 
bands, based on standard errors clustered at country level.   
 
Splitting the sample of 45 countries by income group and geographical region and 
performing sensitivity with respect to country characteristics (such as being a fragile state30 or a 
resource-rich economy31) yields the results in Figure 7 for the Gini index based on disposable 
income. We observe that the negative impact of tax reforms on inequality is strongest in emerging 
market economies possibly due to the fact that these countries´ tax system is more mature and 
well-established. In the middle panel, we observe that the overall sample result is being driven by 
countries outside of-sub-Saharan region as the effect of tax reforms in sub-Saharan African is not 
statistically different from zero. This potentially highlights the lack of income distribution 
considerations embedded in  tax reforms implemented in Africa (who happen to be largely fragile 
states) and/or the lack of transfer programs in these countries and/or inability of tax reforms to 
                                                 
30 In one of the sensitivity analyses conducted, tax reform episodes in fragile states are excluded given their rather 
unique social and economic characteristics. More recent research has shown (Baer and others, 2020) that tax reform 
design in fragile states should be different from that adopted in other developing countries. In our sample of  10 fragile 
states, 7 are in SSA. 
31 Recently, Davis (2019) tested the proposition that economies specializing in mining and oil production have high 
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make a perceptible difference to tax-to-GDP ratios in these countries. Results are slightly stronger 
when removing either fragile states or those rich in natural resources, with a fall in the Gini index 
of 0.8 percent 5 years after the reform. Fragile states have extremely weak fiscal systems and 
resource-rich countries tend to rely less on non-resource domestic taxes. That said, all in all, 
outliers or specific groups of countries do not seem to be affecting greatly the result found in Figure 
6.32 
 
Figure 7. Impact of Tax Revenue Reforms on the Gini Index (Disposable Income) by 
Group of countries (percent) 
Emerging Market Economies Low-income Countries 
  
SSA countries Non-SSA countries 
  
All excluding resource-rich countries All excluding fragile states 
                                                 
32 We also tested whether countries – in our sample – with an IMF-supported program yielded different distributional 
effects after tax reforms compared to those not under a program. Results (not shown but available upon request) 
suggest that countries not under an IMF-supported program achieved larger and significant falls in disposable income 
Gini vis-à-vis those countries with a program (in which the dynamic effects on the Gini index are not statistically 







































Note: x-axis in years; t=0 is the year of the tax reform shock. Solid black lines denote the response to a tax reform 
shock, blue dashed lines denote 90 percent confidence bands and green dashed lines denote 68 percent confidence 
bands, based on standard errors clustered at country level.   
 
A relevant question is whether the effect of tax revenue reforms on inequality varies by tax 
policy instrument. To address this question, we re-estimate our main equation (1) for tax reforms 
in the each of the following individual tax areas: personal income tax, corporate income tax, value-
added tax, trade taxes, property taxes and revenue administration reforms.33 
Results suggest that reforms in all of these individual tax categories are associated with a 
decline in the Gini index, with the effect being larger (in absolute value) for personal income tax 
as one would expect, followed by revenue administration reforms which tend to improve tax 
compliance, property taxes and corporate income taxes (Figure 8). In particular, by conducting an 
independent analysis on each of the eight revenue administration categories (cf. footnote 29), 
results show that measures dealing with large taxpayers office and segmentation of revenue 
administration and customs clearance seem to be the most important in lowering the Gini index in 
the  short run and medium-run, respectively.34 
Note that our results confirm those found by Cevik and Correa-Caro (2020) for a sample 
of transition economies that income tax helped improve income distribution. Statistical 
significance of personal income tax is larger than when considering our aggregate tax reform 
variable (that adds up all of the reforms in all individual tax categories) because some of these 
individual sector reforms were implemented simultaneously. The negative impact of value-added 
and trade taxes is smaller and the latter also marked by a higher degree of uncertainty, as evidenced 
by wide confidence bands above and below zero. For SSA countries (not shown), we observe that 
revenue administration reforms did not have any statistically significant impact on income 
                                                 
33 Other less important taxes such as excises or subsidies are omitted for reasons of parsimony but available upon 
request. 
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distribution over the period under scrutiny. In contrast, it seems that in the very short-run, PIT 
reforms led to a worsening of the Gini index. 
 
Figure 8. Impact of Tax Revenue Reforms on the Gini Index (Disposable Income) (percent) 
Revenue Administration Personal Income Tax 
  
Corporate Income Tax Value-added Tax 
  
Trade Tax Property Tax 
  
Note: x-axis in years; t=0 is the year of the tax reform shock. Solid black lines denote the response to a tax reform 
shock, blue dashed lines denote 90 percent confidence bands and green dashed lines denote 68 percent confidence 
bands, based on standard errors clustered at country level.   
 
B.   Robustness  
Sensitivity 
A possible bias from estimating equation (1) using country-fixed effects is that the error term 
may have a non-zero expected value, due to the interaction of fixed effects and country-specific 
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function of k. To address this issue, equation (1) was re-estimated by excluding country fixed 
effects from the analysis. Results in Figure 9 (top panel) suggest that this bias is negligible. 
The baseline specification does not include year fixed effects to allow for waves of tax 
reforms, that is, the possibility that different types of tax policy and revenue administration reforms 
may occur within the same year. Indeed, in these circumstances, including time fixed effects would 
“partial-out” these reforms and affect the overall estimated effects of tax reforms on income 
distribution. To check the robustness of our results, we re-estimate equation (1) including year 
fixed effects. The estimated effects of tax reforms on inequality without year fixed effects are 
presented in Figure 9 (middle panel) and do not change the main thrust of our results. 
In addition, to try and estimate the causal impact of tax reforms on income distribution 
proxies, it is important to control for previous trends in dynamics of the Gini index or income 
shares that could lead to tax reforms. The baseline specification attempts to do this by controlling 
for up to two lags in the dependent variable.35 To further mitigate this concern, we re-estimate 
equation (1) by including country-specific time trends as additional control variables. Results in 
Figure 9 (bottom panel). 
 
Figure 9. Sensitivity: Impact of Tax Revenue Reforms 
No country effects 
Gini Disposable Income (percent) Income share of Bottom 10% (percentage points) 
  
Time effects 
Gini Disposable Income (percent) Income share of Bottom 10% (percentage points) 
                                                 
35 Similar results are obtained when using alternative lag parametrizations. Results for zero, one and three lags (not 



















Gini Disposable Income (percent) Income share of Bottom 10% (percentage points) 
 
 
Note: x-axis in years; t=0 is the year of the tax reform shock. Solid black lines denote the response to a tax reform 
shock, blue dashed lines denote 90 percent confidence bands and green dashed lines denote 68 percent confidence 
bands, based on standard errors clustered at country level.   
 
 
Controlling for additional short-term drivers of inequality 
Another possible concern regarding the analysis is that the results may suffer from omitted 
variable bias, as reforms may be carried out because of past economic conditions or past concerns on 
public finances´ sustainability or at the same time as other macroeconomic policy actions that affect 
income distribution proxies. To address this issue, we expand the set of controls to include other 
variables that have been typically found to affect the evolution of inequality (see e.g. Jalles and Mello, 
2019; Cevik and Correa-Caro, 2020). In particular, we include the following additional control 
variables: real GDP per capita; trade openness (given by the sum of exports and imports over GDP); 
government expenditure (% GDP); old age dependency ratio; share of value added in agriculture (% 
GDP). These controls are retrieved from the World Bank´s World Development Indicators. The 
economic rationale behind their inclusion in the augmented vector X of equation (1) is as follows. The 
inclusion of real GDP per capita stems from the empirical debate around the notion of the Kuznets 
curve – the nonlinear (U-shaped) relationship between economic development and inequality. As for 
the role of globalization – here proxied by trade openness – there is no consensus in the empirical 
literature: some argue that it benefits the poor (see e.g. Dollar and Kraay, 2004), while others show 
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Milanovic, 2005). There is also a literature negatively relating the size of the public sector (and its 
redistributive power) and income inequality. In a recent work, Guzi and Kahanec (2018) found, using 
a new instrumental variable approach, that much of the literature underestimates the true role of the 
government (measured as government expenditure over GDP) in attenuating income inequality. 
Deaton and Paxson (1997) found that an increase in the share of the population older than 65 tended 
to worsen income inequality and for this reason the age-dependency ratio is included. 
Figure 10 shows the results of the augmented regression. We observe that the effect on the Gini 
index based on disposable income is not statistically significantly different from the baseline result in 
Figure 6. As for the income share of the bottom 10 percent of the population, now the impulse response 
is negative but statistically not different from zero in contrast with the baseline result that found some 
positive impact 5 years after the tax reform. 
 
Figure 10. Additional Controls: Impact of Tax Revenue Reforms 
Gini Disposable Income (percent) Income share of Bottom 10% (percentage points) 
  
Note: x-axis in years; t=0 is the year of the tax reform shock. Solid black lines denote the response to a tax reform 
shock, blue dashed lines denote 90 percent confidence bands and green dashed lines denote 68 percent confidence 
bands, based on standard errors clustered at country level.   
 
 
Controlling for Growth expectations 
Yet another issue is the fact that tax reforms could be implemented because of concerns 
regarding future evolution of economic activity. To address this issue, we control for the expected 
values in t-1 of future real GDP growth over periods t to t+k—that is, the time horizon over which 
the impulse response functions are computed. These are taken from the fall issue of the IMF World 
Economic Outlook for year t-1. Figure 11 shows the results from considering growth expectations 
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Figure 11. The role of expectations: Impact of Tax Revenue Reforms 
Gini Disposable Income (percent) Income share of Bottom 10% (percentage points) 
 
 
Note: x-axis in years; t=0 is the year of the tax reform shock. Solid black lines denote the response to a tax reform 
shock, blue dashed lines denote 90 percent confidence bands and green dashed lines denote 68 percent confidence 
bands, based on standard errors clustered at country level.   
 
Dealing with endogeneity: Instrumental Variable Estimation 
While the previous robustness checks go a long way toward mitigating endogeneity concerns, 
we still check the robustness of our results by using an Instrumental Variable (IV) approach. The 
literature has put forward several theories to rationalize why and when reforms (do not) happen. 
We focus on one broad factor examined in the literature: political institutions (see Duval, Furceri 
and Miethe, 2018). Specifically, we use the following set of political economy variables as external 
instruments which we divide in four categories: i) ideology of the governing party/ies, using a 
discrete variable to distinguish between left, center and right (3, 2 and 1, respectively);36 ii) political 
system, using a discrete variable for parliamentary, assembly-elected and presidential forms of 
governments (2, 1 and 0, respectively);37 iii) party fragmentation, using a continuous variable 
bounded between 0 (no fragmentation) and 1 (maximum fragmentation) to capture the number of 
political parties in the lower house of the legislative assembly;38 iv) the strength of democratic 
institutions (measured as polity IV and normalized between 0 and 1).39 Data on these variables are 
taken from the World Bank Database of Political Institutions. 
                                                 
36 Right-wing governments have been associated with more market-oriented reforms (Alesina and Roubini 1992). 
37 Persson (2002) argues that in countries with presidential forms of government, reform implementation faces less 
effective opposition than in countries with parliamentary systems. 
38 In countries where with higher political fragmentation the government may find it more difficult to implement 
reforms (Haggard and Webb, 1994; Roubini and Sachs, 1989). 
39 While democracy can hinder reforms if special interests prevail on general welfare, democratic rulers are typically 
more sensitive to the interest of the public, and so more prone to implement reforms that benefit a large share of the 
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As mentioned earlier, concerning the potential non-exogeneity of income we follow Cevik and 
Correa-Caro (2020) that instrument it using the growth rate of main trading partners retrieved from 
the IMF´s WEO. By means of a two-stage least squares estimator, we re-estimate equation (1) 
using up to two lags of the four political economy instruments and/or growth rate of main trading 
partners as described above.40 The results reported in Figure 12. The three different panels are 
variants of the set of instruments used in the TSLS regression. We observe that the negative 
(positive) impact of tax reforms on inequality (income share of the bottom 10 percent) is larger in 
magnitude and statistical significance relative to the baseline results in Figure 6 above. This seems 
to point to an under-estimation in absolute value of the previous set of coefficients, now corrected 
with an endogeneity-robust approach. Consequently, we are also re-estimating the previous results 
for the individual tax categories with a TSLS approach. 
 
Figure 12. Endogeneity: Impact of Tax Revenue Reforms 
Instrumenting tax reforms with political variables 
Gini Disposable Income (percent) Income share of Bottom 10% (percentage points) 
  
Instrumenting real GDP growth with growth of main trading partners 
Gini Disposable Income (percent) Income share of Bottom 10% (percentage points) 
 
 
Instrumenting both real GDP growth and tax reforms 
Gini Disposable Income (percent) Income share of Bottom 10% (percentage points) 
                                                 
40 To check the validity of our instruments and assess the strength of our identification, we rely on the Kleibergen-
Paap (KP) and Hansen statistics. The KP statistics rejects the null that the different equations are unidentified (using 
Stock-Yogo critical values). The Hansen test statistics suggests that the set of instruments is valid—that is, 


































Note: x-axis in years; t=0 is the year of the tax reform shock. Solid black lines denote the response to a tax reform 
shock, blue dashed lines denote 90 percent confidence bands and green dashed lines denote 68 percent confidence 
bands, based on standard errors clustered at country level.   
 
Redoing then the estimations by tax category separately, accounting for both potential 
endogeneity of a given reform and GDP growth, yields the results in Figure 13. We observe that 
the effects of revenue administration and PIT reforms on inequality are stronger (both in magnitude 
and statistical significance) than the baseline in Figure 7. In contrast, we now get statistical 
insignificance through the time horizon for both CIT and VAT. Trade reforms seem to now have 
a beneficial impact on income distribution from year 4 onwards – a result which was previously 
absent before. Finally, in the case of property taxes the impulse response remains almost 
unchanged. 
 
Figure 13. Endogeneity: Impact on Gini Disposable Income from Specific Tax Revenue 
Reforms (percent) 
Revenue administration Personal Income Tax 
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Trade Tax Property Tax 
  
Note: x-axis in years; t=0 is the year of the tax reform shock. Solid black lines denote the response to a tax reform 
shock, blue dashed lines denote 90 percent confidence bands and green dashed lines denote 68 percent confidence 
bands, based on standard errors clustered at country level.   
 
C.   The Role of Business Cycle conditions 
To explore the role of business cycle conditions for the effect of tax reforms on inequality, 
the dynamic response is now allowed to vary with the state of the economy, as follows: 
 
 𝑦𝑖,𝑡+𝑘 − 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑘
𝐿𝐹(𝑧𝑖,𝑡)𝑅𝑖,𝑡+𝛽𝑘





,     𝛾 > 0 
 
in which 𝑧𝑖𝑡 is an indicator of the state of the economy (the real GDP growth) normalized to have 
zero mean and unit variance. The weights assigned to each regime vary between 0 and 1 according 
to the weighting function 𝐹(. ), so that 𝐹(𝑧𝑖𝑡) can be interpreted as the probability of being in a given 
state of the economy. The coefficients 𝛽𝐿
𝑘 and 𝛽𝐻
𝑘 capture the distributional impact of tax revenue 
reforms at each horizon k in cases of extreme recessions (𝐹(𝑧𝑖𝑡) ≈ 1 when z goes to minus infinity) 
and booms (1 − 𝐹(𝑧𝑖𝑡) ≈ 1 when z goes to plus infinity), respectively.
4142   
As discussed in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012, 2013), the local projection approach 
to estimating non-linear effects is equivalent to the smooth transition autoregressive (STAR) 
model developed by Granger and Teräsvirta (1993). The advantage of this approach is twofold. 
First, compared with a model in which each dependent variable would be interacted with a measure 
                                                 
41 𝐹(𝑧𝑖𝑡)=0.5 is the cutoff between weak and strong economic activity. 
42 We choose 𝛾 = 1.5, following Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), so that the economy spends about 20 percent of 
the time in a recessionary regime—defined as 𝐹(𝑧𝑖𝑡) > 0.8. Our results hardly change when using alternative values 
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of the business cycle position, it permits a direct test of whether the effect of the tax reform varies 
across different regimes such as recessions and expansions. Second, compared with estimating 
structural vector autoregressions for each regime, it allows the effect of tax reforms to change 
smoothly between recessions and expansions by considering a continuum of states to compute the 
impulse response functions, thus making the response more stable and precise. 
Results suggest that the response of the Gini index to tax revenue reforms varies 
significantly depending on prevailing business conditions (Figure 14, panel a)). In order to reduce 
more rapidly income inequality and improve the income prospects of the poorest strata of the 
population, it is more effective to implement tax reforms when the economy is growing relatively 
slowly. This result is in line with the famous Churchill´s claim to “never let a good crisis go to 
waste”. This may also reflect the fact that fiscal policy in developing countries is typically pro-
cyclical (Jalles, 2020) and that during a downturn, governments cut spending that paradoxically 
helps lower inequality because benefits of public spending are largely captured by the rich. During 
boom periods, the effect of such reforms on income distribution is zero but the share of income 
going to the bottom 10 percent suffers.   
Results are also robust to re-estimating equation (2) without measuring business cycle 
conditions through a smooth transition function, but instead more simply through a dummy 
variable that takes value 1 when the GDP growth rate of the country considered is below its sample 
average and zero otherwise (Figure 14, panel b)). Results are in line with those in panel a) 





Figure 14. State Contingent Regression: Impact from Tax Revenue Reforms over the 
Business Cycle 
a) Using F(z) with real GDP growth 
Recession Expansion 
Gini Disposable Income (percent) 
  
Income share of Bottom 10% (percentage points) 
  
b) Using Recession Dummy Variable 
Recession Expansion 
Gini Disposable Income (percent) 
  
Income share of Bottom 10% (percentage points) 
  
Note: x-axis in years; t=0 is the year of the tax reform shock. Solid blue lines denote the response to a tax reform 
shock, blue dashed lines denote 90 percent confidence bands, based on standard errors clustered at country level. The 
solid yellow lines denote the unconditional (baseline) result for a given dependent variable. 
 
D.   Does the Size of the Tax System or the Size of the Government matter? 
Martinez-Vasquez et al. (2010) find a non-linear effect of the tax ratio on income inequality 
depending on the size of the tax system. Focusing on a sample of 116 countries between 1972-
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taxation system. The results suggest a positive effect on income inequality in countries with a small 
tax system, but a negative effect in countries with a larger size taxation system. For the subsample 
of developing countries there was no statistically significant effect of the tax mix on income 
inequality. With this in mind, we consider an alternative version of equation (2) where instead of 
the state of the economy, we use an indicator of the size of the tax system (the tax revenue to GDP 
ratio). Here, δ = 1 is used to assess the role of the fiscal policy.43 Results are displayed in Figure 
15 top panel. We can observe that countries with smaller tax systems are in a better position to 
enact and implement tax reforms as they will have a larger beneficial impact on income 
distribution, compared with countries with larger tax systems (possibly as these have less room for 
maneuver in terms of e.g. increasing tax progressivity). In this sense our results support Martinez-
Vasquez et al. (2010) claim.  
Our last exercise has the premise that the ultimate purpose of a tax system is to raise 
sufficient revenue to finance its expenditure. In fact, taxes can also influence redistribution 
indirectly by raising the available funds for social transfers: larger governments reduce inequality 
more (Joumard et al., 2012; Fournier and Johansson, 2016; Causa and Hermansen, 2017). We now 
consider another alternative version of equation (2) where instead of the state of the economy, we 
use an indicator of the size of the government proxied by total government expenditure (% GDP). 
As in the case of the size of the tax system, δ = 1 is used. Note that using in such a STAR function 
an indicator of fiscal policy is not new. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012, 2013) and Abiad, 
Furceri, and Topalova (2016) employed a similar approach but they looked at the nature of the 
prevailing fiscal stance by using shocks defined in terms of government consumption forecast 
errors. Results are displayed in Figure 15 bottom panel. We can observe that tax reforms 
implemented in countries with smaller governments have a larger impact in reducing inequality. 
As government size is typically negatively correlated with income inequality, tax reforms that aim 
at raising the amount of available funds at the disposal of the government, can help – e.g. through 
enlarged social program transfer schemes – to reduce income inequality, compared with a state 
that is already too large. In fact, the effects of tax reforms in countries with either big tax systems 
or governments is not statistically different from zero possibly because tax reforms in developing 
countries are correlated with spending cuts that actually reduce the size of these programs. 
                                                 




Figure 15. Tax and Government Size: Impact from Tax Revenue Reforms (percent) 
Using F(z) with tax revenue 
Small tax system Large tax system 
Gini Disposable Income 
  
Using F(z) with government expenditure 
Small Government Large Government 
Gini Disposable Income 
  
Note: x-axis in years; t=0 is the year of the tax reform shock. Solid blue lines denote the response to a tax reform 
shock, blue dashed lines denote 90 percent confidence bands, based on standard errors clustered at country level. The 
solid yellow lines denote the unconditional (baseline) result for a given dependent variable. 
 
 
6. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
 
Domestic revenue mobilization is a fundamental component of any sustainable development 
strategy.44 This is particularly salient in developing countries where low revenue levels are often 
one of the most important impediments to (inclusive) growth. More worrisome than the fact that 
in some developing countries revenue collection is stagnating, is the fact that revenue systems are 
becoming less fair.45 At a time foreign aid is diminishing, it is paramount for developing countries 
to pay more attention to raising more revenue domestically in a fair manner. Revenues collected 
                                                 
44 According to Mascagni, Moore and Mccluskey (2014) governments in developing countries need additional 
financial resources to address the huge development challenges they face. 
45 The lack of progress in revenue generation is creating significant policy challenges in many developing countries 
because it is not keeping the pace with planned expenditures. This has resulted in cuts to spending or increasing 
deficits or in increased use of non-concessional finance to cover the gap. The increase use of non-concessional 
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through the tax system are generally more stable and predictable than those coming from foreign 
aid or domestic non-tax sources. The contribution of taxes is essential to solidify ownership over 
development strategy and can strengthen the bonds of accountability and the social contract 
between citizens and their government and thus have a positive effect on governance. In this 
context, tax reforms have been promoted by International Financial Institutions in recent years as 
an important component of more general economic policy reform in many developing countries. 
However, results of such reforms can take a number of years to see significant effects in domestic 
revenue collection. 
This paper shows new evidence that tax revenue reforms are associated with an improvement 
in income distribution by looking at a sample of 45 developing countries between 2000 and 2015. 
First, we observe that over the last 15 years, inequality - as measured by disposable income - has 
been on a downward trend but this fact is often obscured by the fact that market Gini has been 
increasing since the early 2010´s. This points to a useful and powerful role of the tax-benefit 
redistributive systems in these countries in recent years. This is consistent with the fact that the 
vast majority of tax revenue reforms in our sample were implemented during the period 2010-
2015. Moreover, reforms in tax administration have been more the rule than the exception, 
acompanying a specific tax policy measure. Furthermore, tax reforms have been more frequently 
implemented during periods of higher economic growth. Stylized facts aside, we find empirically, 
by means of estimating impulse response functions, that 5 years after a general tax reform, the 
Gini index falls by one standard deviation (less than one percent) and this effect is statistically 
significant. This result is driven by countries outside of sub-Saharan Africa as the effect of tax 
reforms on Sub-Saharan African countries income distribution is not statistically different from 
zero. Results are slightly stronger when either fragile states or those rich in natural resources are 
removed from the sample, reflecting the inappropriateness of tax reforms in fragile states. For all 
sample countries, a general tax reform can help raising the income share of the bottom 10 percent 
of the population by 0.5 percentage points after 5 years. We find that the most important tax 
reforms for distributional purposes are in the areas of personal income tax and revenue 
administration. However, revenue administration reforms in sub-Saharan Africa did not have any 
statistically significant impact on income distribution. It seems that in the very short-run, PIT 
reforms worsened the Gini in these countries, calling into question their design. Our results are 
robust to a battery of tests including the exclusion of country fixed effects, the addition of time 
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effects and time trends, controlling for other short-term drivers of inequality (including 
expectations about future growth). Moreover, we also conducted endogeneity robust estimations. 
We also found that the response of the Gini index to tax revenue reforms varies significantly 
depending on prevailing business conditions. In order to reduce more rapidly income inequality 
and improve the income prospects of the poorest strata of the population, it is more effective to 
implement tax reforms when the economy is growing relatively slowly. Finally, the smaller the 
government and the smaller the tax system, the larger the beneficial impact of tax reforms on 
income distribution. 
Increasing tax revenues is an ambitious and complex task that depends upon several factors 
(such as the efficiency of tax systems, the level of institutional capacity, the degree of compliance, 
the power of tax administrations, among others). Policy-wise there is great potential to capture 
more revenue in better ways in many developing countries: by eliminating wasteful tax incentives 
or improving the effectiveness of direct taxation, such as property, wealth or corporate taxation. 
That said, the design of policy must balance the efficiency and distributional costs of different tax 
instruments available to the government.  
Finally, our results leave some questions open for future research. Perhaps most importantly, 
cross-country distributional differences go way beyond the tax revenue area covered in this paper 
and include, among others, reforms in areas such as financial markets, pension and healthcare 
systems, and international trade and foreign direct investment. A more systematic investigation of 
their aggregate effects on income inequality would therefore be welcomed. In addition, the effect 
of tax reforms on distributional outcomes is likely to vary across countries depending on their 
specific structural characteristics, particularly those of a political economy nature.46 Further 
investigating these could shed light on the extent and underlying drivers of cross-country 
heterogeneity in the distributional impacts of reforms. This paper did not elaborate on efficiency 
considerations nor did it look at whether the tax composition is optimal from a welfare point of 
view. This could also be an avenue of future research. Lastly, and relatedly to the last point, this 
broad macroeconomic research agenda should be supported by more micro-econometric analyses 
                                                 
46 Political barriers are in part responsible for a reliance on narrow technocratic reforms which are being ineffective 
at raising more revenues. 
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at household and firm levels, in order to shed light on the mechanisms through which tax revenue 
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List of Countries by Region 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa (# 17): Burundi, Cabo Verde, Central African Republic, Comoros, Republic of Congo, Gambia, 
Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Liberia, Malawi, Rwanda, Seychelles, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Namibia, Uganda, Burkina Faso 
 
Asia (# 8): Cambodia, Laos, Maldives, Nepal, Philippines, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu. 
 
Latin America (# 10): Ecuador, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Uruguay, Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, Guyana, Belize, 
Jamaica 
 
Commonwealth of Independent States (# 5): Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Ukraine 
 
Middle East (# 4): Afghanistan, Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco 
 
Eastern Europe (# 1): Bulgaria  
 
 
Table A1. Summary Statistics – Tax Revenues (% GDP), 2015 
Variable  observations Mean  Standard deviation minimum maximum 
Tax revenue 45 18.12 6.38 6.50 32.24 
PIT 25 3.33 2.00 0.21 7.19 
CIT 26 2.67 1.33 0.0004 5.71 
Property 23 0.58 0.72 0.0004 2.52 
GST 31 6.25 2.60 1.35 11.04 
VAT 28 6.21 2.63 0.03 11.04 
Excises 28 2.41 1.37 0.18 5.35 







Figure A1. Impact of Revenue Administration Reforms on the Gini Index (Disposable 
Income) by type (percent) 
management, governance and HR audit and verification 
  
large taxpayers office and segmentation management of payment obligations 
  
IT system improving compliance 
  
registration and filling customs clearance 
  
Note: x-axis in years; t=0 is the year of the tax reform shock. Solid black lines denote the response to a tax reform 
shock, blue dashed lines denote 90 percent confidence bands and green dashed lines denote 68 percent confidence 
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